I Introduction
Identifying exclusionary conduct is one of the most controversial tasks in antitrust. As evidenced by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Joint Hearings on Single Firm Conduct, antitrust jurisprudence is still in the process of identifying what conduct a fi rm with market power can engage in without creating the risk of antitrust liability. Two areas of signifi cant concern involving potentially exclusionary conduct are tying (and bundling) and exclusive dealing. Both tying and exclusive dealing can potentially harm competition and generate anticompetitive eff ects under certain conditions that may be diffi cult to identify in practice. Further, both tying and exclusive dealing contracts are prevalent in markets without signifi cant antitrust market power and have a number of procompetitive uses. The key question for antitrust policy is how to design optimal rules when the costs of false positives (fi nding liability for an effi cient practice) signifi cantly outweigh the costs of false negatives (failing to condemn an anticompetitive practice).
In this chapter, we consider the legal framework applied to tying, bundling and exclusive dealing arrangements and survey the relevant economic literature.
II Tying and bundling arrangements
A tying arrangement occurs when, through a contractual or technological requirement, a seller conditions the sale or lease of one product or service on the customer's agreement to take a second product or service. 1 The term 'tying' is most often used by economists when the proportion in which the customer purchases the two products is not fi xed or specifi ed at the time of purchase, as in a 'requirements tie-in' sale. 2 A bundled sale typically refers to a sale in which the products are sold only in fi xed proportions (for example, one automobile and one radio; one pair of shoes and one pair of shoe laces; or a newspaper, which can be viewed as a bundle of topicspecifi c sections such as sports, national news, local news and entertainment). Bundling may also be referred to as a 'package tie-in'. 3 Case law in the US sometimes uses the terms 'tying' and 'bundling' interchangeably.
A Legal analyses of tying and bundling
American law's treatment of tying has undergone a major transformation. At fi rst tying was treated as an inherently anticompetitive, per se unlawful practice. 5 In 1947, in International Salt Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that 'it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market'.
6 Then in 1949, in Standard Oil Co. v . United States, the Court opined that '[t] ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition '. 7 Since that time, however, although US courts have continued to state that tying is per se unlawful, 8 they have allowed many tying arrangements to escape automatic condemnation by establishing conditions that must be met before the per se category applies. Beginning with its landmark "Fortner II" decision in 1977, 9 the Supreme Court began to require substantial proof of market power in the tying product before the per se rule would be applied. Although the Court's 1984 Jeff erson Parish majority opinion continued to give lip service to a per se analysis 10 -while reemphasizing that market power in the tying product was a requirement for per se illegality 11 -four of the nine Justices issued a separate opinion supporting application of a case-by-case rule of reason to tying. 12 Later that same year, the Court explained that the application of the per se rule to tying had evolved to incorporate a market analysis: [T] here is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifi es a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. For example, while the Court has spoken of a 'per se' rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifi cations that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis. 13 Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged that, in contrast to its 'historical distrust of tying arrangements', 14 there are '[m]any tying arrangements . . . [that] are fully consistent with a free, competitive market'. 15 Indeed, the test that lower courts use to determine whether to apply the per se rule to a particular alleged tie 'increasingly resembles a rule of reason inquiry'. 16 Although the elements of a per se tying violation have been articulated diff erently, courts generally require that:
(1) two separate products or services are involved, (2) the sale or agreement to sell one is conditioned on the purchase of the other, (3) the seller has suffi cient economic power in the market for the tying product to enable it to restrain trade in the market for the tied product, and (4) a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product is aff ected. For other per se violations, such as naked agreements to fi x prices, plaintiff s are not required to defi ne the relevant product markets or show that the defendant has market power in the tying product's market. In addition, some courts have shown a willingness to consider business justifi cations for the alleged tie, 18 and some courts have required proof that the tie has anticompetitive eff ects. 19 The limited scope and shaky underpinnings of the per se rule against tying were dramatically underscored in the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit's landmark 2001 decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp. 20 That decision refused to apply the per se rule to 'platform software', 21 thereby creating a 'technology exception' to that rule. 22 The court reasoned that application of traditional per se analysis in the 'pervasively innovative' platform software industry risks condemning ties that may be welfare-enhancing and procompetitive.
23 Certain leading antitrust commentators have opined that 'the rationale [that the court] articulated for abandoning per se condemnation applies well beyond just the software industry', notwithstanding 'the court's protestations to the contrary'. 24 Courts have sometimes analyzed bundling under the rubric of tying. In United States v. Loew's, Inc., 25 for example, the Supreme Court found the practice of licensing feature fi lms to television stations only in blocks (or 'bundles') containing fi lms the stations did not want to license constituted unlawful tying in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 Nonetheless, in explaining its tying analysis in Jeff erson Parish, the Supreme Court noted the fact that 'a purchaser is "forced" to buy a product he would not have otherwise bought even from another seller' does not imply an 'adverse impact on competition '. 27 This later statement suggests that bundling would not constitute unlawful tying if the purchaser simply desires to purchase less than the entire bundle of products off ered for package sale at a reduced price. Rather, to prevail on an unlawful tying claim, the plaintiff would have to show an exclusionary eff ect on other sellers as a result of the plaintiff 's thwarted desire to purchase substitutes for one or more items in the bundle from other sources.
More recently, courts have examined bundling in the context of loyalty discounts. For example, in LePage's, Inc. v. 3M,  28 the defendant 3M off ered a 'bundled discount' on its Scotch brand tape and a variety of other products, provided the retailer met a target for purchases of private label tape from 3M as well. The en banc court affi rmed the trial court's denial of judgment for defendant as a matter of law. 29 The Antitrust Modernization Committee sharply criticized LePage's on the grounds that it off ered 'no clear standards by which fi rms can assess whether their bundled rebates are likely to pass antitrust muster' and is 'likely to discourage fi rms from off ering procompetitive bundled discounts and rebates to consumers'. The Antitrust Modernization Committee proposed an alternative, three pronged standard which would require the plaintiff to demonstrate the following in order to establish a violation of Section 2 in addition to the conventional requirements: (1) after allocating all discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of products to the competitive product, the defendant sold the competitive product below its incremental cost for the competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these shortterm losses; and (3) the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse eff ect on competition.
31
Consistent with the evolution in legal thinking by the courts, the US federal antitrust agencies (the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission) in eff ect endorsed a structured rule of reason for intellectual property tying and bundling in the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property ('Antitrust-IP Guidelines').
32 The Antitrust-IP Guidelines recognize that '[c] onditioning the ability of a licensee to license one or more items of intellectual property on the licensee's purchase of another item of intellectual property or a good or a service has been held in some cases to constitute illegal tying', 33 but also state that '[a]lthough tying arrangements may result in anticompetitive eff ects, such arrangements can . . . result in signifi cant effi ciencies and procompetitive benefi ts '. 34 Pursuant to the Antitrust-IP Guidelines, the agencies consider both the anticompetitive eff ects and the effi ciencies attributable to a tie, and would be likely to challenge a tying arrangement if: '(1) the seller has market power in the tying product', which the agencies will not presume necessarily to be conferred by a patent, copyright, or trade secret; '(2) the arrangement has an adverse eff ect on competition in the relevant market for the tied product; and (3) effi ciency justifi cations for the arrangement do not outweigh the anticompetitive eff ects'. 35 If a package license constitutes tying, 36 the Agencies will evaluate it pursuant to the same rule of reason principles they use to analyze other tying arrangements.
In sum, US courts and federal antitrust enforcement agencies increasingly focus on the actual economic eff ects of particular tying and bundling arrangements in assessing their legality. The ostensible per se prohibition on tying remains applicable only under a limited set of conditions. There is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court will formally reject the per se rule and hold that the antitrust rule of reason applies to tying and bundling, if and when presented with the opportunity to do so.
37

B Economic analysis of tying and bundling
The shift by courts and enforcers toward a more detailed fact-specifi c market analysis of tying and bundling arrangements is consistent with the economics literature. That literature suggests that the potential for anticompetitive harms may vary based on surrounding circumstances and that tying and bundling will often generate effi ciencies. Whether tying and bundling increase or decrease consumer welfare will depend on the circumstances accompanying their use. 38 Nevertheless, many economists believe that, in general, tying and bundling are much more likely to be procompetitive than anticompetitive. 39 1 Theories of competitive harm The early economics literature on tying identifi ed two reasons to question whether tying and bundling are likely, as a general matter, to be useful tools for leveraging monopoly power in one market into monopoly power in a second market. First: tying rarely gives the producer of the tying product a monopoly position in the market for the tied product . . . A new entrant would have no diffi culty in procuring in the open market the requisite cards or ink or salt to supply together with its business machines, duplicating equipment, or salt machinery. 40 Second, a fi rm with a monopoly in the tying product may be unable to increase its profi ts by seeking to collect rents from a complementary product. Under the 'one monopoly profi t argument', if the same consumers are buying both products in fi xed proportions, it is the total price that determines consumer sales and the monopolist's pricing decisions. Consequently, a monopolist would have to lower the price on the tying product to keep the total price unchanged at the profi t-maximizing level.
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As such, the principal motives for the tie would not be exclusionary conduct aimed at monopolizing the market for the tied product in order to raise its price. Rather, the fi rm could be using the tie for some other purpose, such as price discrimination or reducing costs.
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Further analysis has demonstrated that these conclusions rely on some restrictive assumptions, for example, that the same consumers are buying both products in fi xed proportions 43 and that the tied good market has a competitive, constant returns-to-scale structure. By relaxing those assumptions, some economists have identifi ed exclusionary motives for tying, as well as strategic reasons for bundling and tying. 44 One such line of analysis suggests that, under certain cost and demand conditions, a tying arrangement can enable a monopolist in a tying market to reduce demand for rival products in a second, imperfectly competitive tied market, thus injuring competition. 45 A commitment by the monopolist of the tying product to sell the tying and tied products only as a package enables the monopolist to commit to aggressive pricing of the tied product. If the monopolist raises its price for the tied product, the commitment to tying means that it loses not only some tied product sales, but also some sales in the profi table, monopolized tying product market.
In eff ect this enables the monopolist to commit itself to a low implicit price for the tied product. 46 When the market for the tied product exhibits scale economies and therefore is oligopolistic, committing to a low price may reduce competitors' sales and force them to exit. 47 Consumer harm may occur because 'when tied market rivals exit, prices may rise and the level of variety available in the market necessarily falls'. 48 While providing a potential motivation for exclusion, the analysis points out that 'the impact of this exclusion on welfare is uncertain'.
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Another line of analysis shows that tying may be used to preserve an insecure monopoly in the tying product.
50 Consider a fi rm that is a monopolist in a primary market and also sells a complementary product in a duopoly market. In addition, the primary and complementary products must be used together to provide value to consumers. The rival seller in the complementary product market can enter the primary market after incurring an entry cost. To deter the rival in the complementary product market from entering the primary market, the monopolist will tie the primary product with its version of the complementary product. By selling only the combination of products, the monopolist is committing to a low price in the complementary market, just as in the model described above. This practice can deny the rival seller in the complementary product market enough sales so that it is not worthwhile for the rival to incur the cost of entering the primary market.
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Yet another explanation for the monopoly tying of complementary products posits that under certain conditions the tie allows a monopolist to capture some of the producer's profi ts of the complementary good. and raise or lower output. Non-monopolists may both gain market share and reduce prices to consumers through tying or bundling. 56 A fi rm that sells two complementary products has an incentive to lower the price of one to increase sales of the other. In this case, the fi rst fi rm to act in this manner enjoys a huge market-share gain over its uncoordinated rivals. Moreover, those rivals do not respond by off ering bundles of their own, because that would serve only to intensify the competition and leave the rivals worse off . In this scenario, bundling can reduce all prices, because consumer prices are lower when one fi rm that bundles competes against fi rms that sell single components independently than when no fi rms bundle. 57 2 Procompetitive effi ciencies Theoretical work in economics suggests that tying or bundling may often generate effi ciencies. Economists postulate that tying and bundling can enhance consumer welfare in many ways, such as economies of joint sales, quality assurance and protection of goodwill, and cheating on a cartel price. Economies of joint sales, for example, are present throughout the economy, as in the case of shoes and shoelaces and indeed virtually every manufactured product. Quality assurance may be achieved by tying sales of products to sales of services (warranty repair) or consumables (fast-food franchisees may be required to buy critical ingredients from the franchisor). Cheating on a cartel price may be accomplished by bundling the cartelized product with valuable extras that act as a secret price discount on the cartelized product. In addition, price discrimination, such as through metering, can allow markets to be served that would not be served under a single-price monopoly. For example, light and heavy users of printers may both be served if they can buy a manufacturer's printer at a low price and its ink cartridges at a price above marginal cost. 58 Metering theories, of course, apply only when products can be purchased in variable proportions.
Some of the potential effi ciencies result from joining the products in a single bundle. Empirical work on tying and bundling in competitive markets is consistent with the theory that such practices can reduce production costs. For example, consumers can purchase cold tablets that bundle active ingredients to relieve coughs, congestion and headaches at a signifi cantly lower eff ective price than if the consumer purchased each of those remedies individually, because the incremental cost of adding one more active ingredient to a tablet that already is being produced is negligible. 59 Competition can cause much of the cost savings from bundling to accrue to consumers, making consumers better off than if there were no bundling. 60 Moreover, when the incremental cost of bundling separate goods is small, competition often will result in fi rms off ering the goods both separately and in a bundle, which can improve consumer welfare. Providing choice may be costly, however. It may not be effi cient to provide one of the products separately if only a few consumers prefer it. For example, such a high proportion of consumers want to buy both the left and right shoe as a bundle that the remaining customers do not justify selling them separately. Limiting the combinations of options can simplify production, which lowers costs and presumably prices to consumers.
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Thus, although Ford Motor Company off ers many options on its Ford Taurus, it off ers them only in certain combinations or packages of options, so that not all possible combinations of options are available to consumers. 63 Limiting combinations of options can save fi xed costs associated with a full range of product off erings and can foster product-specifi c cost reductions.
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Consistent with this reasoning, a study by two economists found that the bundling of so-called information goods, such as copyrighted music, programming, and other online content on the Internet, may prove welfare-superior to selling such goods on an individual basis. 65 The study noted that the marginal cost of adding additional units of an information good to a bundle of other information goods typically is very low, and that the demand for bundles of goods across customers can be more homogeneous than the demand for the individual components. In such circumstances, it can be more profi table to off er such goods only in a bundle. The study also found that competition between two fi rms that each off er suffi ciently large bundles can make consumers better off , 66 and bundling by a fi rm facing no competition can increase total welfare but increase or decrease consumer welfare. 67 3 Empirical evidence A full understanding of the eff ect of any particular tie or bundle requires a careful analysis of the circumstances surrounding the practice at issue. That likely competitive eff ects will be fact-dependent makes it diffi cult to craft statements of general application about the likely competitive eff ects of tying and bundling. Even an apparently benign statement such as 'off ering consumers choice is better than not off ering choice' may not be correct. Off ering consumers more choices can be costly for fi rms; if the costs of providing more choice exceed the benefi ts to consumers, more choice can make consumers worse off . 68 Thus, economists caution against confusing the 'theoretical possibility of harm with an empirical demonstration of such a harm'. 69 One economist has observed that the diffi culty of identifying market settings in which tying and bundling might have exclusionary eff ects, and the fact that bundling can serve a purely effi ciency-enhancing role in some market settings, 'make . . . the specifi cation of a practical legal standard [for tying and bundling] extremely diffi cult'. A former chief economist of the Federal Trade Commission has argued that documented instances of anticompetitive tying are extremely rare and may not exist. 71 Other economists have made this point about vertical restraints (which include tying and bundling, among other practices) in general. 72 Noting the paucity of empirical support for the proposition that vertical restraints harm consumers (based on a literature review), they argue that one should infer that vertical restraints are likely to be benign or welfare enhancing.
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In short, the very limited empirical evidence that exists suggests that tying and bundling are unlikely to be anticompetitive. This supports the trend of the US courts to refuse to condemn these practices absent case-specifi c evidence of actual anticompetitive eff ects.
III Exclusive dealing
Exclusive dealing contracts involve a supplier conditioning its sale on the buyer's commitment not to purchase from the supplier's rivals. 74 While this technical defi nition of exclusive dealing requires the buyer to forgo all purchases from the rival supplier, some contracts involve 'partial' exclusivity, which involve the buyer committing to a fi xed quantity of purchases or a percentage of its total purchases to the supplier in lieu of a 'full exclusive'. The menu of contracts implicating exclusive dealing includes more than full and partial exclusives. For instance, the economic and legal issues concerning exclusive dealing contracts are also implicated in the analysis of 'loyalty discounts' and other contracts which involve supplier commitments to discounts. For example, antitrust analysis of the competitive eff ects of 'all units' and other non-linear discounting schemes where the supplier commits to a discount if the retailer purchases a certain quantity or percentage of total purchases from the supplier can usefully be thought of as exclusive dealing contracts. 75 Exclusive dealing and exclusionary contracts more generally involve a broad spectrum of contracts in our modern economy. These contracts present a number of important antitrust issues requiring principled distinctions to be drawn between procompetitive exclusive dealing and arrangements that might threaten competition and harm consumers.
We begin by discussing antitrust analysis of exclusive dealing contracts with reference to a number of recent legal decisions and conclude by summarizing the economics of exclusive dealing, including possible anticompetitive eff ects, procompetitive explanations, and the empirical evidence.
A Legal analysis of exclusive dealing
Exclusive dealing contracts have never generated a substantial amount of suspicion under the law. Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, and in the early days of Sherman Act jurisprudence, exclusive dealing contracts 'continued to be upheld routinely except in rare instances involving actual monopolization '. 76 Hostility to exclusive dealing increased after the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. The fi rst challenges to the practice under Section 3 of the Clayton Act resulted in the Supreme Court holding unlawful the arrangements in Standard Fashion Co. v A decade later in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 81 the Court ushered in a new era of exclusive dealing jurisprudence in its last exclusive dealing case. The Court articulated that the plaintiff would be required to show that 'the competition foreclosed by the contract must be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant market'. 82 The Court refused to condemn the exclusive dealing contracts at issue in that case on the grounds that the coal supply contract between Tampa Electric and Nashville Coal was found to be less than 1 per cent of the coal supplied from the Appalachian area.
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Since Tampa Electric, the evolution of antitrust jurisprudence concerning exclusive dealing has been limited to lower courts with the exception of the Supreme Court's tying decision in Jeff erson Parish that held that a 30 per cent foreclosure would not be suffi cient to support a claim. One commentator summarizes modern treatment of the foreclosure analysis in exclusive dealing cases as 'routinely sustain[ing] the legality of exclusive dealing arrangements with foreclosure percentages of 40 per cent or less '. 84 Despite the occasional hostility to exclusive dealing and exclusionary contracts, antitrust jurisprudence has generally acknowledged that competition for contract is 'a vital form of rivalry . . . which the antitrust laws encourage rather than suppress'. 85 Acknowledging the potential consumer benefi ts that fl ow from exclusivity, modern antitrust analysis insists that plaintiff s make a prima facie showing of a number of necessary conditions for consumer harm before shifting the burden to the defendant to establish effi ciency justifi cations for its conduct. While this showing includes foreclosure analysis, it also involves a broader inquiry into the potential for the exclusive contracts at issue to harm competition rather than merely disadvantage rivals. This analysis is fairly constant whether the arrangements are challenged under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The modern 'rule of reason' analysis evaluating exclusive dealing contracts focuses on a number of factors, including: the defendant's market power, the degree of foreclosure, entry conditions, the duration of the contracts at issue, whether exclusivity has the potential to raise rivals' costs, the presence of actual or likely anticompetitive eff ects, and business justifi cations. Areeda and Hovenkamp articulate the prima facie case for exclusive dealing claims as follows:
In order to succeed in its claim of unlawful exclusive dealing a plaintiff must show the requisite agreement to deal exclusively and make a suffi cient showing of power to warrant the inference that the challenged agreement threatens reduced output and higher prices in a properly defi ned market . . . Then it must also show foreclosure coverage suffi cient to warrant an inference of injury of competition . . . depending on the existence of other factors that give signifi cance to a given foreclosure percentage, such as contract duration, presence or absence of high entry barriers, or the existence of alternative sources or resale.
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A leading exclusive dealing case involving Philip Morris ('PM') and its 'Retail Leaders' program provides a useful illustration of modern antitrust analysis.
87 Retail Leaders, introduced in October 1998, involved four diff erent 'participation levels' corresponding to both the magnitude of PM payments and the amount of advantageous display space provided to PM. At the highest two levels of Retail Leaders, PM not only made promotional payments to retailers but also granted retailers an 'industry fi xture' that would occupy a specifi ed percentage of total display space for cigarettes. At the highest level, this percentage was 100 per cent. At the mid-level of Retail Leaders, the industry fi xture would occupy half of the total category of display space, specifying that PM brands were to be allocated proportionately to PM's market share (otherwise known as a 'space-to-sales' allocation). The other half of category space was to be divided between a 'prime fi xture', constituting approximately 25 per cent of category space and promoting only PM brands, and a 'retailer's choice fi xture', occupying the remaining 25 per cent of the space and containing competing brands and signage. 88 Several other details of the Retail Leaders program warrant mention. First, PM paid retailers with per unit discounts known as retail display allowances ('RDAs').
89 Second, it was undisputed that Retail Leaders contracts were terminable at will without penalty upon 30 days' notice.
90
Third, under each Retail Leaders level of participation, retailers were never required to grant PM more than 'space-to-sales', or a greater percentage of shelf space than its market share. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The court, after initially issuing a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff s, granted PM's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case on the grounds that PM did not have market power, and, alternatively, that the Retail Leaders program did not suffi ciently foreclose rivals from the market. Specifi cally, the court found that Retail Leaders foreclosed only 34 per cent of the market, that plaintiff s successfully competed against PM for premium shelf space and signage and that retailers were able to terminate agreements at will.
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Competition between tobacco manufacturers for valuable shelf space resulted in a boon to consumers as RDAs were passed on in the form of lower prices.
93 While anticompetitive foreclosure is a viable concern, the key policy requirement is that the competitive process for distribution is left 'open', meaning that rival manufacturers have the opportunity to bid for shelf space. This condition is clearly satisfi ed where contracts are of short duration and easily terminable like those in the Retail Leaders program. 94 In fact, it appears that PM's prices fell relative to competitors after the implementation of Retail Leaders, suggesting that the program was procompetitive.
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As RJR II illustrates, the duration of exclusive dealing contracts is an important component of modern antitrust analysis. Exclusive dealing contracts covering shares of the market suffi cient to otherwise trigger liability under a standard foreclosure analysis are routinely upheld where the contracts involve short-term commitments which allow rivals to compete for distribution.
96 RJR II illustrates the standard framework in modern exclusionary distribution cases, which requires a demonstration of the defendant's market power, substantial foreclosure, contracts of suffi cient duration to prohibit meaningful competitive bidding by rivals and an analysis of actual or likely competitive eff ects.
B Economic analysis of exclusive dealing
The primary anticompetitive concern with exclusive dealing contracts is that a monopolist might be able to utilize exclusivity to fortify its market position and ultimately harm consumers. As a general matter, these concerns also extend to other contracts, such as loyalty and market-share discounts, which we discuss separately in Section III.C.
Theories of competitive harm
The most common scenario of antitrust relevance involving exclusive dealing contracts concerns an upstream supplier, S, entering into an exclusive dealing contract with retailers, R, who in turn sell the product to fi nal consumers. The potentially anticompetitive motivation associated with exclusive dealing contracts is clearly related to the limitation placed by that contract on R's ability to sell rival products to fi nal consumers. The possibility of anticompetitive exclusion occurring from these types of contracts generally arises only if S is able to foreclose rival suppliers from a large enough fraction of the market to deprive those rivals of the opportunity to achieve minimum effi cient scale. 97 The well-known critique of this line of reasoning comes from the Chicago School argument that R will not have the incentive to agree to contracts that facilitate monopolization upstream because they will then suff er the consequences of facing that monopolist in their chain of distribution. 98 As a general matter, one can think of this criticism as drawing the analogy to a conspiracy among retailers, R, organized by the monopolist S to exclude S's rivals from access to distribution. 99 Like any other conspiracy, it is generally the case that each R has the incentive to deviate and remain outside the agreement by contracting with S's rivals and expanding output at the expense of rival retailers. 100 In other words, retailers have the incentive to avoid entering agreements that will ultimately harm them, and S will generally not be able to compensate retailers enough to enter into the anticompetitive exclusive contract. 101 The critique goes on to argue that observed exclusive dealing contracts must generate effi ciencies rather than anticompetitive eff ects.
The economics literature has grown in recent years to include a series of theoretical models contemplating scenarios where S can suffi ciently compensate retailers to join and remain within the conspiracy and therefore accomplish an anticompetitive purpose. These anticompetitive theories of exclusive dealing generally assume that S supplies a product that is essential to R's viability and that there are substantial economies of scale in manufacturing.
One such theory considers the case where the monopolist S adopts exclusive contracts rather than merely collecting its monopoly profi t from the sale of the essential product and relies on the existence of dynamic economies of scale such as network eff ects. 102 Under this dynamic theory of exclusion, S's exclusive contracts prevent S's rivals or potential entrants from developing into future rivals, in order to protect future market power. Because S's rivals must operate at a cost disadvantage that drives them out and prevents entry, S is able to increase the duration and scope of its market power. 103 A second set of models explores the possibility that coordination problems between buyers prevent the foiling of S's anticompetitive use of exclusive dealing contracts. There is a substantial industrial organization literature analyzing the conditions under which these types of coordination problems between buyers generate the possibility of anticompetitive exclusion. The seminal article of this type is by Rasmussen, Ramseyer, and Wiley ('RRW'), 104 later refi ned by Segal and Whinston ('SW'). 105 The unifying economic logic of these models is that the potential entrant (or current rival) must attract a suffi cient mass of retailers to cover its fi xed costs of entry, but S's exclusive contracts with retailers prevent the potential entrant from doing so. It is then necessary to work out the conditions under which such exclusion is either not possible, possible, or probable. A number of factors, in addition to the degree of downstream retail competition, have been identifi ed in the exclusive dealing literature as either favoring the theoretical possibility of exclusion or rendering it less likely or impossible. Signifi cant economies of scale in distribution militate against exclusion because, in that case, a potential entrant may need to attract only a single buyer in order to achieve minimum effi cient scale. Similar logic suggests that a small number of buyers will be able to coordinate in order to support the excluded rival. Further, the exclusionary equilibrium in this model appears relatively fragile because an alternative equilibrium in which buyers reject exclusivity also exists. 106 Recent extensions of these models focusing on the case where buyers are competitive downstream retailers rather than fi nal consumers have produced a wide range of confl icting results under various conditions. 107 Fumagalli and Motta consider the role of retail competition in the RRW-SW framework and demonstrate that the incentives to exclude can disappear in this setting as one buyer becomes large enough to support the entry or viability of a rival. 108 Simpson and Wickelgren derive a model that produces the opposite result, arguing that downstream competition enhances the incentive to exclude as the benefi ts to a single buyer of resisting exclusion are minimal if all retailers are equally disadvantaged because retail competition will allow retailers to pass those costs on to consumers. 109 The development of this literature has increased our knowledge about the potential theoretical impact of exclusive dealing contracts. However, the models generating anticompetitive exclusion generally rely on strict assumptions concerning the existence of signifi cant economies of scale, barriers to entry, the nature of both upstream and downstream competition and, importantly, the complete absence of effi ciency justifi cations for the contracts. Where the necessary conditions of those models are satisfi ed, they demonstrate that exclusive dealing contracts may harm consumers and thus are an appropriate subject for antitrust scrutiny and further analysis.
2 Procompetitive effi ciencies Exclusive dealing arrangements are often effi cient and result from the normal competitive process. Exclusive dealing contracts are often observed between fi rms lacking any meaningful market power, implying that there must be effi ciency justifi cations for the practice. Indeed, the economics literature is replete with procompetitive explanations for exclusives and partial exclusives. 110 The standard procompetitive account of exclusive dealing contracts involves use of exclusive dealing contracts to prevent free-riding dealers from using manufacturer-supplied investments to promote rival products. 111 For example, a manufacturer may make investments, such as purchasing display fi xtures or training salespeople. Dealer free-riding on these investments involves using these investments to promote rival brands. The classic example of this type of free-riding in the antitrust context is Ryko Manufacturing Co. v. Eden Services, 112 where a manufacturer of car wash equipment used exclusive territories and exclusive dealing contracts to prevent its dealers from switching consumers to other brands. By facilitating dealer performance, the exclusive dealing contract allows manufacturers to collect a return on their investments and increase output.
A recent article by Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner expands our understanding of the use of exclusive dealing by demonstrating how exclusivity minimizes free-riding in two cases where there are no manufacturersupplied investments: fi rst, free-riding on manufacturer-fi nanced promotion to sell rival products, and second, free-riding in the form of failing to supply the promotion paid for by the manufacturer altogether, even in the absence of dealer switching. 113 First, because manufacturers often compensate retailers for the provision of promotional services such as premium shelf space, 114 dealers have incentives to use these additional promotional eff orts to switch consumers to other products upon which the dealer earns a greater profi t. Exclusive dealing can be used to prevent this type of free-riding in an analytically identical manner to the way it prevents free-riding on manufacturer-supplied investments. 115 The second type of free-riding examined by Klein and Lerner also involves manufacturer-fi nanced promotion. Because dealers are being compensated for promotional eff ort on the basis of total sales (both marginal and infra-marginal), and non-performance is costly to detect, dealers have an incentive not to supply the agreed upon promotional inputs. 116 Exclusive dealing mitigates the incentive to free-ride in this way by increasing the dealer's incentive to promote the manufacturer's product. Courts have recognized this somewhat intuitive justifi cation for the use of exclusive dealing in Joyce Beverages 117 and Roland Machinery, noting the incentive eff ects of 'dedicated' or 'loyal' distribution. 118 Klein and Lerner provide an economic basis for understanding the mechanism by which dealers more actively promote the manufacturer's product in this case and consider whether Dentsply's 'dealer loyalty' justifi cation for its use of exclusive dealing was improperly rejected. effi cient uses of exclusive dealing. One such use involves the role of exclusive dealing by individual retailers, including those without any market power, to intensify competition by manufacturers for their business and to improve purchase terms. By off ering manufacturers access to the retailer's loyal customer base, a retailer is able to commit a substantial fraction of its customers' purchases to the 'favored' supplier and thereby dramatically increase each supplier's perceived elasticity of demand by making rival products highly substitutable. 120 Wright extends this analysis to explain the use of category management contracts where the particular quantity and type of shelf space devoted to the manufacturer's products is not contractually set by the retailer, but is fl exibly determined over time by the category captain, a fi rm selected by the retailer to assist and infl uence decisions concerning which products in a product category are stocked, as well as how they are displayed, promoted, and priced. 121 In contrast to the case where the optimal shelf space commitments are stable, well known, easily specifi ed by contract, and non-performance is easily detected by the manufacturer, category management contracts off er increased fl exibility where such commitments are imprecise and change over time.
3 Empirical evidence As discussed, the theoretical literature focuses on the question of whether exclusive dealing contracts limit competition or are a procompetitive element of the competitive contracting process designed to solve incentive confl icts between manufacturers and retailers over the supply of promotional services. If the anticompetitive theories are correct, one expects that exclusive dealing contracts will increase prices and decrease output. Conversely, if the procompetitive theories are correct, prices should decrease and output should increase. Thus, confl icting theories generate confl icting predictions regarding the competitive eff ects of exclusive dealing on output and consumer welfare.
Existing empirical evidence of the impact of exclusive dealing is scarce but generally favors the view that exclusive dealing is output-enhancing. Heide et al. conducted a survey of managers responsible for distribution decisions and found that the incidence of exclusive dealing was correlated with the presence of 'free-ridable' investments.
122 Both Asker and Sass separately examine the welfare consequences of exclusive dealing in the beer market by observing the eff ect of exclusive dealing on total market output, as well as the output and prices of rival distributors, concluding that exclusive dealing is output increasing and does not generate foreclosure. 123 
C Loyalty discounts 124
Loyalty discounts are a form of non-linear pricing in which the buyer's discount increases after a buyer-specifi c minimum threshold requirement is satisfi ed. One such discount is known as an 'all units' discount which applies the per unit rebate to all units purchased by the buyer if, and only if, it satisfi es the threshold. A similar form of rebate is a 'market-share discount', which requires a buyer to make a specifi ed share of its purchases from the seller in order to qualify for the discount. The relationship between loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing contracts is relatively straightforward, as the latter involves the special case where the discounts are granted if and only if the threshold commitment requires the buyer to make 100 per cent of its purchases from the supplier. We will refer to these loyalty rebate programs, such as market share discounts and all-units discounts that require less than full exclusivity, as 'partial exclusives' and reserve use of 'full exclusive' to specify 100 per cent exclusivity. Loyalty discounts and 'partial exclusives' have generated a substantial amount of antitrust scrutiny in recent history, particularly after the LePage's decision, which involved a multi-market or 'bundled discount'. 125 In this Section, we will focus on single-product loyalty discounts alleged to have exclusionary eff ects similar to exclusive dealing. 126 Single product partial exclusives have been involved in a number of recent antitrust cases, including FTC v. McCormick, 127 RJR II, 128 Barry Wright, 129 Concord Boat, 130 and Brooke Group.
131
In each of these cases, the supplier off ered dealers 'loyalty discounts' in the form of partial exclusives. Many of these rebates were 'all units discounts', meaning that they were applied to all of the dealer's purchases once the minimum threshold was satisfi ed, including those in Barry Wright and Concord Boat, and possibly the discounts at issue in Brooke Group. 132 The partial exclusives in McCormick and RJR II likely did not involve an 'all units' feature, but off ered increased discounts upon the commitment of a specifi c share of shelf space to the supplier's product. For example, in McCormick, which ultimately resulted in a settlement, the complaint alleged that the slotting contracts, manufacturer payments to retailers for preferred shelf space, included provisions that 'typically demand that the customer allocate the large majority of the space devoted to spice products -in some cases 90% of all shelf space devoted to packaged spices, herbs, seasonings and fl avorings of the kinds off ered by McCormick -to McCormick'. 133 McCormick did not off er a procompetitive justifi cation for these contracts, and specifi cally, the restrictions on distributing rival products. While Philip Morris' Retail Leaders shelf space arrangements contracts survived R.J. Reynolds's antitrust challenge in RJR II because the contracts were of short duration and therefore could not suffi ciently foreclose rivals' access to distribution, the court did not fi nd the contracts had any persuasive procompetitive business justifi cation.
While partial exclusives may generate the same type of 'raising rivals' costs' concerns as full exclusives, the important question is whether these contracts are capable of producing harm to competition. As a general matter, antitrust analysis of these partial exclusives correctly proceeds by exploring whether the necessary conditions for competitive harm are satisfi ed, including substantial foreclosure and suffi cient duration to prevent competitive bidding for distribution. Unfortunately, because the procompetitive function of partial exclusives is less well understood than that of full exclusives, courts may be tempted to conclude that partial exclusives do not have any redeeming effi ciencies and more likely to fi nd any potential anticompetitive eff ect suffi cient to fi nd an antitrust violation.
As discussed above, Klein and Murphy present an analysis of the procompetitive use of full and partial exclusives that may explain the prevalence of these contracts in retail settings. 134 Klein and Murphy consider the role of exclusive dealing and partial exclusives in the setting where consumers choose retailers on the basis of both average retail price and product variety. In essence, while adopting an exclusive imposes some costs on consumers in the form of preventing those consumers from satisfying their preferences for a particular brand, those costs are outweighed by the increase in consumer welfare generated by the retailer acting as a competitive bargaining agent for its customers, resulting in lower wholesale prices. This procompetitive justifi cation extends to the case of partial exclusives, which give the retailer the fl exibility to satisfy consumers with a clear preference for a rival brand. This avoids a large fraction of the consumer welfare losses associated with failing to stock a product highly demanded by some subset of consumers, while still extracting some benefi ts of the exclusivity in the form of increased ex ante competition for all consumers. Klein and Murphy apply this explanation to a number of partial exclusive contracts, including those in McCormick, the category management shelf space contract in El Aguila Food Products v. Gruma, 135 and the restrictive promotion contracts adopted in Coca-Cola v. Harmar 136 and RJR II. 137 Wright applies this partial exclusive analysis to the case of category management contracts where the retailer dedicates, without contractual discretion, a signifi cant portion of its shelf space by allowing the category captain to determine or infl uence shelf space allocation and stocking decisions.
138
IV Conclusion
A large number of antitrust investigations in the United States involve tying, bundling, and exclusive dealing contracts. These practices have much in common from the standpoint of economic analysis. For instance, the potential effi ciencies associated with both tying and exclusive dealing, and the fact that both are prevalent in markets without signifi cant antitrust market power, lead most commentators to believe that they are generally procompetitive and should be analyzed under some form of rule of reason analysis. Further, the anticompetitive theories applied to both tying and exclusive dealing generally involve 'raising rivals' costs' and the potential for the practice to foreclose rivals or acquire monopoly power in a second market. Despite these similarities, the legal analysis of these two practices remains remarkably divergent with the modifi ed per se approach still applied to tying practices and a more sophisticated rule of reason analysis emphasizing potential consumer welfare eff ects applied to exclusive dealing. While developments in economic theory generally take some time to generate corresponding changes in competition policy, our analysis of these practices suggests that the adoption of a rule of reason for tying and presumptions of legality for both practices under certain conditions may be long overdue. See, e.g., LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (involving a 'bundled discount' off ered by 3M on its Scotch brand tape and a variety of other products provided the retailer met a target for purchases of private label tape from 3M as well). The en banc court affi rmed the trial court's denial of judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 3M Co. v. LePage's Inc., 542 US 953 (2004 ) (No. 02-1865 , denying cert. to 324 F.3d 141, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.pdf (urging the Supreme Court to deny review but criticizing the Third Circuit's en banc decision for providing little guidance on how Section 2 should be applied to bundled rebates, failing to explain why 3M's conduct was unlawful, and perhaps encouraging challenges toand therefore chilling the adoption of -procompetitive bundled rebate programs); see also Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (fi nding 'package price' discounts that covered both competitive markets and markets in which defendant had a monopoly did not violate Section 2, because plaintiff did not show that either (1) Econ. 283 (1990) . 46. For example, if (contrary to fact) a monopolist in DVD players (the tying product) committed to sell both its DVD player and a CD player (the tied product) only as a bundle for $300, a customer willing to pay $250 for a DVD player would obtain the CD player for $50, because the consumer already was willing to pay $250 for the DVD player. Thus, the commitment to bundle would set an implicit low price for the tied product, the CD player. 47. Whinston, supra note 43, at 839. 48. Id. Although originally presented in the context of goods with independent demand, this analysis can also apply to complements. 49. Id. at 855-6. 50. See Carlton & Waldman, supra note 45. 51. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ) ('Microsoft's eff ort to gain market share in one market (browsers) served to meet the threat to Microsoft's monopoly in another market (operating systems) by keeping rival browsers from gaining the critical mass of users necessary to attract developer attention away from Windows as the platform for software development.'). 
